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Abstract
The electric grid serves a vital role in the supply
chain of nearly all industrial and commercial
organizations. A Microgrid infrastructure can provide
this service and beneficial non-emergency services
including a variety of generation/energy sources. To
demonstrate the applicability of microgrids for energy
resiliency, we present a microgrid resiliency case study
for United Parcel Service’s (UPS) three separate
shipping facilities. The goal, to enhance energy security,
minimize cost and prevent cascading losses within other
related business units. The impacts and consequences of
which are quantified in this study using a Mean Failure
Cost (MFC) risk assessment measure. MFC accounts
for the potential loses to identified stakeholders that
may result from a set of identified failures due to a set
of identified threats. In this case, our study uses a
method we call All Hazards Econometric System
(AHES). AHES incorporates the cost of COOP using a
strategy that considers the payback period of microgrid
installation as compared to other energy delivery
strategies.
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critical plant loads and operations, as well as the local
electric grid. This paper will demonstrate methods for
calculating risk, designing a microgrid, and normal
operation cost recovery.
Electrical outages affect millions of customers in the
U.S. every year. Increasing the resilience to natural and
man-made events of the electric grid can have farreaching societal benefits. Some of the largest
individual consumers of electricity are industrial
facilities. Industrial customers require highly reliable
power to properly do business, and an electrical outage
at the wrong moment can cause losses in the millions of
dollars per hour.
Many facilities have backup generation, which is
both simple and proven. However, as the electric grid
modernizes, the use of microgrids as a backup system
can provide benefits to both the facility and the electric
grid. Benefits to an industrial customer with an installed
microgrid include: 1) reduced risk from natural and
man-made grid outages; 2) enhanced resilience to
abnormal grid conditions; and 3) integration and
optimization of energy generation sources for more
efficient and economical operation.

1.1. Reduction in Risk

1. Introduction
Industrial-scale
microgrids
offer
increased
resilience, reduced risk, and enhanced controls for
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Every facility has risk from loss of energy supply.
These risks are numerous, and it is up to the business
manager to make “informed choices” on where and
when to spend finite resources to protect the entire
facility with regards to mitigating the risk of outages and
thus addressing energy assurance.
Microgrid designs are also numerous, and can range
from small, cheap installations that mitigate some risk
to very large, expensive installations which significantly
reduce facility risk. Using a value-based metric, this
paper quantifies the risk of an enterprise system for each
stakeholder based on the amount of loss that results from
security threats and vulnerabilities.
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1.2. Enhanced Resiliency
In the event of energy supply loss, a sufficiently
sized microgrid can continue to operate the facility,
independent of the state of the electric grid supply chain.
Large facilities require advanced controls and
coordination of assets to operate in an islanded mode,
but the facility gains resiliency and reduces downtime.
Many facilities have some form of backup
generation for critical loads, like emergency lighting.
Microgrids can be designed to run the entire facility
without grid power for days, hours, or just long enough
to gracefully shut down the equipment to avoid damage
and loss of inventory. This paper investigates microgrid
designs which cover both ends of the continuum and
quantify their impacts.

1.3. Integration and Optimization
A microgrid installation typically involves the
collection
and
communication
of
multiple
measurements and device parameters to a controller,
which coordinates the generation and loads. A
microgrid can allow for more active control over a
facility, by interacting with the process control system
to reduce inactive processes based on available
generation for peak load reduction. Microgrid
installations can now achieve this goal while addressing
operational goals that include reliability improvements,
cost reduction and market participation [1].
Microgrids also enable integration of many different
types of fuel sources, diversifying the generation mix
while reducing the probability of single points of failure.
Solar arrays, natural gas turbines, diesel engines, and
battery storage each have properties which can be
beneficial to the reliability and resilience of a facility. A
mix of generation resources can help to mask the
resources’
individual
deficiencies,
such
as
intermittency, long startup times, and inefficient
operation. For example, a software optimizer can
capture device behaviors to allow for automatic control
of resources toward a common goal.

1.4. Utility Participation
Utilities base the rate they charge industrial
customers via specific utility program parameters (e.g.,
cost/kWh during peak load periods). By participating in
utility programs, industrial customers seek a positive
return on their investment (ROI) during grid operations
while simultaneously contributing a needed service to
the grid. Instead of a rarely used backup, the generation
can have a more active role in maintaining the stability
and resilience of the local power system.

Figure 1: The Workflow of Cyber Security
Econometrics System (CSES)
During grid operations, an industrial microgrid
allows for more active industrial customer participation
in utility programs. During peak demands, utilities make
requests of their industry partners such as demand
reduction. A request for demand reduction can be
achieved through either the industry partner shedding
load or increasing generation. The microgrid gives
flexibility to the industrial customer in how to best
achieve the desired load reduction.

1.5. United Parcel Service (UPS) Study
As a partner in the study [2], the UPS Worldport,
Centennial Hub, and Supply Chain Solutions (SCS)
campus in Louisville, KY demonstrated the validity of
the approach described here.
The facility’s risk mitigation strategy was
determined using the All Hazards Econometrics System
(AHES) method. AHES was used to evaluate the ROI
for two microgrid improvement options. The first was a
reduced operational sort (i.e., closing down certain
sorting lanes) and the second solution considered
additional resources to allow continued normal
operations. AHES is an adaption of the Cyber Security
Econometrics System (CSES) [3]. CSES’s high-level
workflow is illustrated in Figure 1. For each of these
(fairly) different facilities, multiple microgrid
improvement options were modeled with the opensource Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Microgrid
Design Toolkit [4]. Each microgrid solution ranged
from a lower cost, with a small reliability improvement,
to a more expensive cost, with a high reliability
improvement. Combining these two methods and tools
resulted in a newly developed approach for predicting
and mitigating industrial “peak” loads. We estimated
resiliency improvement, installed cost and cost
avoidance for each proposed risk mitigation strategy
along with a coincidental cost recovery benefit derived
from normal microgrid operations.

2. Background
The DOE’s Grid Modernization Laboratory
Consortium (GMLC) Multi-Year Program Plan [2]
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states, “…security and resilience of the modern electric
grid may be defined as the functional preservation of the
electric grid operations in the face of natural and manmade threats and hazards.”
While the U.S. electric grid is highly reliable, severe
weather events and cyber-attacks threaten to cause
extensive damage to its aging infrastructure, resulting in
extended periods of outage for customers. The
economic impacts of weather-related outages in 2012
were estimated at between $27 and $52 billion [5]. Since
2000, the five-year average number of outages per year
has doubled every five years, and the average number of
monthly outages have increased six-fold [6].
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
defines industrial electricity customers as the “facilities
and equipment used for producing, processing, or
assembling goods” [7]. Industrial electricity customers
make up 0.56% of electricity customers [8], but account
for roughly 25% of all energy sales in the U.S. [9]. A
single hour-long outage can cause the loss of hundreds
of thousands to millions of dollars in output, lost
inventory, brand degradation, and restart costs.
A microgrid, per DOE’s terms [10], is: ‘‘a group of
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources
within defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single
controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid
can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to
operate in both grid-connected or island mode.’’
Microgrid research is constantly evolving to include
advanced controls and communication systems for a
wide range of applications [11] [12] [13] [14].
Capabilities enabled by microgrid technologies include:
1) seamless transition; 2) renewables integration; 3)
voltage support; 4) peak shaving, 5) economic dispatch;
6) energy shifting; and 7) black start.

2.1. Case Study Environment
First-generation microgrids have focused primarily
on priority critical loads, such as hospitals, military
bases, and college campuses [15] [16] [17]. These types
of facilities play vital roles to the country and are
dependent on highly reliable power.
Similarly, many industrial facilities are critical to the
daily operations of people and businesses across the
country. The UPS Worldport facility is the largest
automated package handling facility in the world [18]
[19], processing approximately 416,000 packages per
hour. As an air hub with more than 300 flights arriving
and departing daily, Worldport has very strict
requirements on flight schedules. Even a small electrical
outage which stops the sorting equipment for a few
minutes causes far-reaching ripples to those people and
businesses depending on their service. Delays on timecritical packages such as refrigerated vaccines and

living tissues could be disastrous to those depending on
the materials.
UPS is a global leader in logistics, offering a broad
range of solutions including transporting packages and
freight; facilitating international trade, and deploying
advanced technology to more efficiently manage the
world of business. Headquartered in Atlanta, UPS
serves more than 220 countries and territories
worldwide. The facilities of interest include: Worldport,
Centennial Hub, and SCS campus (though SCS data is
not included in this analysis).

3. Process and Results
To understand how a microgrid bolsters resilience
for a facility, it is critical to quantify the risks the facility
faces daily and design to mitigate specific scenarios.
The All Hazards Econometrics System (AHES) is a
Cybernomics computational method for determining
Mean Failure Cost (MFC) [20] [21] [22], modified
herein from Cyber Security Econometrics System
(CSES) [3] [23] [24] used previously in industrial
settings [25]; applied to industry standards [26] [27];
and applied to cloud environments [27] [28]. The
cost/benefits risk assessment of the project [2] was
carried out by computing the Mean Failure Cost (MFC)
for various UPS stakeholders addressing grid
vulnerability, consequence, and risk analysis. The
reduction in MFC can then be matched against the costs
and risks of deploying them, using relevant ROI
functions.

3.1. Tools Used to Determine Mean Failure Cost
The value-based metric (MFC), when applied,
quantifies the risks to an enterprise system on an
individual stakeholder basis. MFC represents the loss
that potentially results from threats and system
vulnerabilities. MFC depends on the inherent system
infrastructure (e.g., weaknesses) and accounts for the
stakeholders’ variances in terms of their individual
mission requirements, that are satisfied via that
infrastructure has in meeting each enterprise
requirement.

3.2. Steps for Determining Mean Failure Cost
The essential steps involve I/O components and phases
(i.e., discovery, classification and evaluation, metrics
and mitigation as shown in Figure 1). The data
collection/analysis consist of systems stakeholders,
system specifications and requirements. System
components makeup the requirements and the
associated natural threats that exist. These natural
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threats have the potential of causing a negative impact
on the normal operations of the overall system. In this
study, we address only rigorously documented natural
hazards (i.e., threats) which cannot be altered (i.e., are
immutable). The steps in determining MFC, when
applied, result in the AHES method which was
essentially derived as part of this case study.
To estimate the MFC for the set of stakeholders of a
system, we identify and then maintain the following
information: (1) the set of stakeholders; (2) the set of
functional specifications/requirements; (3) for each
stakeholder row and each requirement column, the stake
that the stakeholder attaches to the selected service (or
conversely, the cost that the stakeholder incurs if the
service is disrupted (i.e., Stakes Matrix (ST)); and (4)
for each component column of a specific requirement
row (i.e., Dependency Matrix (DP)), the likelihood that
the system provides that specific service requirement.
The likelihood of a materialized threat column entries
impacting the component row entries (i.e., Impact
Matrix (IM)) is dependent on the probability of the
emergence of a threat (i.e., Probability Threat vector
(PT)) and the likelihood that such a threat would affect
that component. The AHES method involves the
generation of ST, DP, IM, as well as the PT. We derive
the vector of mean failure costs (one entry per
stakeholder) by Eq. (1) as a baseline:
MFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ IM ◦ PT

(1)

3.3. IM Generation Using Mitigation Cost
Estimates
Several studies in the past have used CSES to assess
changes (i.e., Δ) resulting from mitigations (e.g.,
investments aimed at improving/hardening the
infrastructures). The MFC formula [29] maps a threat
configuration (PT) onto a vector of mean failure costs
(MFC). When a security measure is deployed, its impact
can be measured by considering how it affects the threat
configuration (say, PT' instead of PT) and thereby how
it affects (hopefully reduces) the MFC vector (MFC'
instead of MFC). In [30], the ΔMFC was used as a
measure of the effectiveness of security measures in
hardening the infrastructure. This measure supported
the following decisions.
First, stakeholders can determine whether a measure
is worthwhile by matching its deployment cost against
its benefit, represented in terms of the reduced MFC
(and represented in monetary terms). The decision can,
in fact, be modeled as a return on investment (ROI).
Second, analysts can also use the MFC reduction for
each stakeholder as a basis for distributing the cost of

the measure on the various system stakeholders. In [30],
we discussed alternative ways to do this.
Third, managers can use the cost sharing formula to
assess how much the measure costs them and use the
MFC reductions to quantify their respective gains from
the measure. Using this information, an ROI is
computed. An ROI enables us to determine whether the
measure benefits them individually. Previously
documented approaches illustrated this premise [31].
For the sake of illustration, previously documented,
consider the threat vector has been reduced to the new
value: PT՛. The gain in mean failure cost can then be
estimated using the equation:
ΔMFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ IM ◦ ΔPT

(2)

where ΔPT = PT՛ – PT. This results in the gain in
MFC in monetary units/time frame and shows the added
value gained by stakeholders.
The following example illustrates how to judge the
cost effectiveness of a given enhancement. For a given
security enhancement measure, the service provider can
determine the cost effectiveness by comparing the cost
of installing the enhancement versus the gains in
subscriber fees collected because of enhanced security
(minus any subscriber loss that may result). This can be
modeled as a ROI decision, as discussed in [30] and
adapted from [22] [23].
Since we are only concerned about naturally
occurring hazards (i.e., threats), which cannot
necessarily be altered, we introduce a new concept for
AHES that can be regulated. Natural hazards are
normally assumed to occur based on historical evidence
[32]. The effect of a materializing threat can however,
be mitigated by improving/hardening the cyber/physical
infrastructure. Moreover, the damage anticipated can be
reduced if the enterprise environment is altered (i.e.,
harden the system) based on the risk informed
assessment information. Thus, we introduce a new
interpretation which results in a change from the
baseline probability represented in IM from the baseline
that Component Ck fails once threat Tq has materialized
giving us IM՛ or ΔIM.
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as
expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost)
can now be estimated as:
ΔMFC = ST ◦ DP ◦ ΔIM ◦ PT

(3)

where ΔIM = IM՛ – IM. This results in a positive gain
overall for the MFC in monetary units/time frame (in
our case $/day). This moreover, shows the added value
(ROI) gained by stakeholders from an enhanced
architecture. Equally, in our case, the analysis helps us
understand the savings produced from hardening the
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enterprise against natural threats and
assists decision makers in commercial
ROI decisions. The resulting AHES
method (calculation of MFC) helps
decision makers by putting a monetary
value on the service that is delivered to
stakeholders.
In
general,
the
stakeholders collectively perform the
organizational mission requirements
and therefore the overall benefactor is
the organization or “enterprise” as
discussed above.

3.4. Estimating ΔMFC – A Case
in Point

Table 1. Collective UPS Facilities Specific Daily Monetary Failure
Loss by Stakeholder*
Stakeholder
Worldport

Volume Per
Day (# of
Packages)

Revenue
per
Package

Revenue per
Day (Failure
Cost)

1,600,000

$18.86

$30,332,800

Centennial Hub –
640,000
$8.37
$5,356,800
Current
Centennial Hub 1,360,000
$8.37
$11,383,200
Expansion
* Data calculated from UPS, Inc. second quarter earnings report ending June
30, 2017 [34].

The failure cost in each column’s cell in Table 2 is
the monetary amount for the respective stakeholder (the
row entry) when the system fails to meet each
stakeholder’s functional requirement. We therefore
quantify theses variables in terms of financial loss per
unit of operation time (e.g., $/day); it represents the
mean loss that the stakeholder may experience in case
of a failure.
Table 1 represents the potential monetary loss by a
stakeholder. The analysis team worked closely with
UPS participants to determine the best and most
accurate data to populate the AHES matrices. Data was
analyzed from the UPS, Inc. second quarter earnings
report ending June 30, 2017, and was used to calculate
the Worldport and Centennial Hub stakeholder’s
monetary loss [34]. The following logic was used to
determine the Worldport and Centennial Hub,
stakeholder’s mean financial loss:
Worldport - From the 2017 second quarter earnings
report [34], the per package revenue is calculated as a
weighted combination of two revenues: the next day
delivery cost and the international package cost. The
revenue per package is comprised from 80% of the next
day delivery sort revenue ($19.62 per package) plus

Stakeholders

In [32], Louisville Metro prepared its Hazard
Mitigation Plan pursuant to the Section 322 of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5165, as amended by Section
104 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, P.L. 106390 (DMA 2000) and regulations set forth in 44 CFR
§201 [33]. The Plan identifies potential hazards,
assesses risk, and presents mitigation strategies to build
community resilience. The expected loss is reduced if
we alter the enterprise environment (i.e., harden the
system).
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as
expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost) is
thus estimated as shown in Eq. 3. In the analysis of the
UPS Worldport and Centennial facilities at Louisville,
Kentucky, we considered the unique stakeholders for
the enterprise as the following: 1) UPS Facilities at
Louisville – UPS Enterprise Stakeholders collectively;
2) UPS Facility – Worldport Stakeholders; and 3) UPS
Facility – Centennial Hub Stakeholders. The individual
contribution of the respective stakeholders is
documented in Table 1.
The collective UPS Enterprise
Table 2. Collective UPS Facilities Stakes (ST) Matrix: Populated
Stakeholders at the Louisville complex
UPS Stakeholders versus UPS Louisville Facility Requirements*
versus their respective requirements can
Requirements
be depicted as the Stakes Matrix (ST)
Table 2. The logic for the ST depends on
Centennial
No Req’t.
Stakes (ST)
Worldport
the following premises: (1) a stakeholder
(Expansion)
Failure
Availability
Availability
(NRF)
may have different stakes in different
UPS Enterprise
requirements; and (2) a functional
$30,583,000
$11,380,000
$0
Collectively
requirement may carry different stakes
Worldport
for different stakeholders. The best way
$30,332,000
$0
$0
to represent this situation is through a
Centennial Hub
two-dimensional matrix, where the rows
$0
$5,356,800
$0
(Current)
represent stakeholders, the columns
Centennial Hub
$0
$11,383,200
$0
represent operational requirements and
(Expansion)
the entries represent stakes, as shown in
* Source data derived from UPS, Inc. 2017 second quarter earnings report [34]
Table 2.
and from [35].
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Figure 2: AHES’ Risk Mitigation Flowchart
Centennial Hub “Expansion” – The expansion of
enhanced technology in the Centennial Hub facility will
increase capacity to 85,000 packages per hour,
improving both reliability and quality of service
provided to UPS customers [35]. The UPS Centennial
Hub will triple the size of the current package sorting
facility to 838,000 square feet, and nearly double its
current sorting capacity to 85,000 packages per hour
[36] which results in 1,3600,00 packages per day (two
eight-hour shifts). From the 2017 second quarter
earnings report [34], the per package revenue for U.S.

20% from the total international package revenue
($16.31 per package).
Centennial Hub “Current” – The Centennial Hub
building first opened in May of 2008, with a sorting
capacity of 40,000 packages per hour. That translates in
640,000 packages per day (two eight-hour shifts). From
the 2017 second quarter earnings report [34], the per
package revenue for U.S. Domestic package ground
($8.37) is herein used for calculating the specific daily
revenue per Day Failure Cost.

Table 3. Collective UPS Facilities Dependency (DP) Matrix
Components

Requirements

Dependency (DP)

Installation
Air
Electricity Electric Grid Unique
Computers Lighting Conditioning
Distribution Infrastructure Sorting
Equipment
Equipment

Airplanes
Functioning
&
on time

Truck
Support
NCF
Vehicles
Functioning

Fuel Farm
Availability

0.2

0.2

0

0.2

0.1

0.0

0

0.3

0

World Port
Availability

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

0

0

0

Centennial
Availability

0.2

0.2

0.15

0.2

0.08

0.07

0

0.1

0

NRF

0.4

0.4

0.75

0.4

0.72

0.73

1

6

1

Note: The NRF row represents the case when a component fails but does not affect the associated requirement. The NCF
column represents the case when no component fails.
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Table 4. Collective UPS Facilities Impact (IM) Matrix

Tornado

Earthquake

Severe
Winter
Storms

0.3

0.3

0.04

0.14

0.125

0.1

0.125

0.2

0.1

0

0.3

0.3

0.04

0.14

0.125

0.1

0.125

0.2

0.1

0

0

0.01

0.04

0.1

0.125

0.15

0.125

0

0.1

0

0.1
0.1

0.2
0.02

0.04
0.04

0.1
0.1

0.125
0.125

0.05
0.1

0.125
0.125

0.15
0.15

0.1
0.1

0
0

0.1

0.02

0.2

0.14

0.125

0.1

0.125

0.3

0.1

0

0

0.1

0.3

0.14

0.125

0.1

0.125

0

0.2

0

0.1

0.05

0.3

0.14

0.125

0.1

0.125

0

0.2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Dam Failure
/ Sinkholes /
Landslides

Extreme
Heat /
Drought

Fires /
Chemical
Spills

No Threats

Hailstorms

Electricity
Distribution
Electric Grid
Infrastructure
Installation
Unique
Sorting
Equipment
Computers
Lighting
Air
Conditioning
Equipment
Airplanes Functioning
& On time
Trucks &
Support
Vehicles
Functioning
No
Component
Failure

Severe
Thunder
storms

Components

Impact (IM)

Flooding

Threats

Note: the NCF row represents the case when a threat materializes but does not affect the associated component. The No Threat
column represents the case when no threat materializes.

Components of the UPS enterprise architecture of
the facilities at the Louisville complex may fail to
operate properly because of functional breakdowns
Table 5. Probability Threat (PT) Vector*
Probability Threat (PT) Vector

Probability of
threat
materializing
0.3479
0.0285
0.0077
0.0012
0.0003
0.0174

Flooding
Severe Thunderstorms
Hailstorms
Tornado
Earthquake
Severe Winter Storms
Dam Failure/Sinkholes /
0.0025
Landslides
Extreme Heat/Drought
0.0099
Fires/Chemical Spills
0.3235
Other Threats – Man0.2598
Made – Outside Scope
No Threats
0
All Threats
0.9990
* Calculated from Louisville Metro Hazard Mitigation
Plan “Loss Matrix” table in [32].

Threats

Domestic package ground ($8.37) is herein used for
calculating the specific daily revenue per Day Failure
Cost.
Natural hazards were evaluated. We considered the
dependency of the stakeholders’ requirement of
availability as key to fulfilling the respective
stakeholders’ individual and collective requirements
with regards to their missions.
The respective components to the stakeholder’s
requirements of availability included: 1) Electricity
Distribution; 2) Electric Grid Infrastructure; 3)
Installation Unique Sorting Equipment; 4) Computers;
5) Lighting; 6) Air Conditioning Equipment; 7)
Airplanes Functioning & on time Truck Support
Vehicles Functioning; and 8) No Component Failure
(NCF). The probability of the system failing, with
respect to a given requirement and given that a
component has failed, is shown in Table 3.
UPS, Inc. stated in an annual report on Form 10-K
[37], filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, the following.: “Severe weather or other
natural or manmade disasters could adversely affect
our business.”
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brought about by natural hazards or man-made
Table 6. Collective UPS Facilities Mean Failure Cost
hazardous activity. To continue the analysis,
(MFC) per day in USD*
the natural hazards that threaten the facilities
were cataloged, in the same way that analysts
MFC 99%
MFC
MFC 50%
of a system’s reliability define a fault model.
Stakeholders
Energy
Baseline
Reduced
Sort
We used the catalog of threats that were
Availability
established in the 2016 Louisville Metro
UPS Enterprise $4,418,054
$3,768,523
$1,820,570
Hazard Mitigation Plan (updated every five
Collectively
years) [32], and the Kentucky Emergency
Worldport
$3,085,953
$2,627,759
$1,253,626
Operations Plan (KYEOP) [38] modeled after
Centennial Hub
$557,887
$477,631
$236,942
(Current)
the guidance provided by Department of
Centennial Hub
Homeland Security and FEMA [39]. The
$1,185,511
$1,014,966
$503,502
(Expansion)
entities in Kentucky all-hazards emergency
* AHES) is a Cybernomics computational method for determining
plan are required by Kentucky Revised Statue
MFC [20] [21] [22], modified herein from CSES [3] [23] [24].
(KRS) 39A [40] and is activated upon order of
the Governor of the Commonwealth of
This data may be usurped by recent data concerning
Kentucky [38].
Hurricane Harvey and its cumulative effects in 2017.
Due to Louisville’s geology, climate, and
The above threats are cataloged in Table 4 and their
geographical setting, the metro area is vulnerable to a
respective impacts are populated in Table 4.
wide array of natural hazards that threaten life and
The “Loss Matrix” table in [32] provided
property. The Louisville Metro Hazard Profiles catalogs
quantitative data that portrays which hazards have the
the hazards, which were previously identified as
potential to cause the most devastation, based on
affecting the Louisville Metro Area. These Profiles were
frequencies and damage numbers, where available. The
created using the best available data from a variety of
data was used by the project team to help prioritize
resources, including: the National Centers for
which hazards should receive the most consideration
Environmental Information (NCEI), formerly the
when justifying potential mitigation projects in current
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), National
specific efforts regarding the placement and the
Weather Service (NWS), Louisville/Jefferson County
configuration of the microgrid and its analysis. It was
Information Consortium (LOJIC), Corps of Engineers:
the intent of this effort that other commercial entities,
Louisville District, Kentucky Office of Geographical
including UPS, will use this technique in the future. The
Information, Kentucky Geological Survey (KGS),
loss and occurrence data (based on the number of events
Kentucky State Climatology Center, Midwestern
divided by the total number of damages) was used to
Regional Climate Center (MRCC), FEMA Hazard
populate the threat probability vector (Table 5), which
Mapping website, local agencies and newspaper
is used in calculating MFC. As mentioned [32], this data
articles, previous Local Hazard Mitigation Plan’s, the
can be improved and Louisville Metro is dedicated to
approved 2013 Kentucky Enhanced State Hazard
keeping better loss information to improve the results of
Mitigation Plan [41], and the 2014 Kentucky Operations
this model.
Plan [38].
Given the populated stakes matrix ST, the
Through research of historic impacts, occurrences,
dependency matrix DP, the impact matrix IM and the
dollar losses to date, review of the past State and Local
threat vector PT, we now can derive the MFC by Eq. 1.
Hazard Mitigation Plans and discussions with key
The resultant MFC for the UPS enterprise at the
agencies and stakeholders, the following thirteen (13)
Louisville facility is represented as the MFC per
hazards are assessed in the 2016 Louisville Metro
stakeholder in Table 6.
Hazard Mitigation Plan [32]: (1-2) Flood Related
During the course of this study, a reduced sort (50%)
Hazards
(Flood,
Dam/Levee
Failure,
(3-6)
solution addressed a way to allow the advantages of the
Meteorological Hazards (Tornado, Severe Winter
microgrid to be evaluated in the context of risk
Storm, Severe Storm, Hailstorm), (7-9) Geologic
assessment [45]. The cumulative amount of power by
Hazards (Earthquake, Landslide, Karst/Sinkhole), (10implementing the microgrid solution is also
13) Other Hazard Types (Hazardous Materials,
approximately 50% of the needed power to run the
Drought, Extreme Heat, Fires/Chemical Spills).
facility. Secondly, the SNL MDT model quantified the
Understanding the documented risk and each hazard
energy availability (99%) by adding generator capacity
is critical to determining the impact on the UPS
to UPS’s microgrid. From this data, we reduced from
Louisville facilities. The record for the number of
the baseline: the component “Electric Grid
weather and climate disasters that exceeded $1 billion
Infrastructure” row in the IM (Table 4) by 50%; and the
(U.S. dollars) in losses was set in 2011 [42] [43] [44].
rows, “Electric Distribution”, and “Electric Grid
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Infrastructure” (Table 4) by 99%. Table 6 identifies the
baseline MFC for the specified stakeholders and the per
cent reduction in MFC by hardening the environment by
percentage amounts of 50% reduced sort and 99%.
energy availability.

4. Conclusions
The reduction in MFC (as expressed in USD/day)
was derived by applying Eq. 2. This shows the added
value gained by each stakeholder due to a more resilient
COOP architecture (i.e., hardening the enterprise
against natural hazardous threats). The analysis
provided a basis for prepositioning backup generation
capacity, and enhancements that promise cost savings
and ROI. In this way the AHES method helps decision
makers better understand the value of the service and
that is delivered to stakeholders enabling mission
requirements. These numbers are directly comparable
and give a bottom line understanding of the potential
impact, root cause (i.e., source) that includes the kill
chain from threat to asset and the affect to operations
and in all stakeholders.
The beneficial impact to the collective UPS
Facilities is shown in Table 6. This is achieved by
implementing the various components of the microgrid
solutions. The MFC reduction ranges from 14-15% for
the 50% Reduced Sort and from 56-59% for the 99%
Energy Availability. Based on AHES’s MFC, the best
microgrid implementation that UPS should consider for
their particular facilities’ implementation, has been
reduced to a business decision. The AHES method
provides the logic to “grade” the level of ROI (a graded
approach) desired for this business decision. This paper
considers the industrial viewpoint and uses real world
data for COOP planning.
This work was supported by a grant from DOE. We
derived the AHES methodology from CSES (as the
basis) to track many facets of the cause/loss-impact to
operations. In this way, COOP planners determined the
primary operational weaknesses and could prioritize
course of action based on the cost of mitigation (i.e.,
hardening solutions) and the prospect of ROI. The
artifacts of this investigation will be useful on an
ongoing basis for assessment and risk abatement.
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